power with diverse and very often competing interests. The breadth of expectation across these power centres as to how Tehran's nuclear programme will progress in the years ahead is presumably very wide. Those who have examined Iran and its nuclear programme in any detail will be frustrated by *Nuclear Iran*'s occasional mischaracterizations and errors of fact. Few would describe, as Bernstein does, Iran's centrist regime heavyweight, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as 'the *éminence grise* of the Iranian reform movement' (p. 174). China did not sell Iran 'two tons of uranium ore' as part of their short-lived state-to-state nuclear supply relationship, but two tons of refined forms of uranium—hexafluoride, tetrafluoride and dioxide (p. 77). Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency nor any other convincing authority has ever stated that North Korea has supplied Iran with uranium mining assistance, as the author asserts (p. 77). The front company responsible for Iran's heavy water production plant at Arak is the Mesbah Energy Company, not 'the Messiah Energy Company' (p. 159)—although the latter would clearly be the more sensational brand-name. Alongside these substantive problems, other issues suggest a rush to publication. The book's elegant cover features a photograph which is not of 'reactor cooling towers' as the image credit states, but a conventional gas combined-cycle power plant. (For this the error apparently lies with Getty Images.) And a map of Iran sourced from Wikimedia inexplicably uses a mix of Spanish and French labels.

Bernstein's well-told anecdotes about key figures in the history of centrifuge and nuclear reactor development mean that this book is ultimately enjoyable. But those hoping for a pithy, insightful analysis of Iran's nuclear programme and its history will be left unsatisfied.

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Military responses to the Arab uprisings and the future of civil–military relations in the Middle East. By William C. Taylor. New York: Palgrave. 2014. 268pp. Index. £26.00. ISBN 978 1 13741 004 7. Available as e-book.

In his book *Military responses to the Arab uprisings and the future of civil–military relations in the Middle East*, William C. Taylor searches for the dynamic causes of the Arab uprising. He especially focuses on the military responses of the Arab armies to the public demonstrations and presents a comparative analysis of the Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria revolutions.

In chapter one, Taylor outlines his study and emphasizes the effect of people's demands rather than the influence of external powers in the Arab awakening. He introduces a new lens through which to analyse civil–military relations in the Middle East, arguing that the 'restraints and interests' analysis is the best way to comprehend military actions. He defines *restraints* 'as any mechanism that limits the military's power, freedom of movement, or decision-making ability' and *interests* 'as any motive that might cause the military to lend its support to the popular uprising rather than the regime' (p. 46). According to this typology *high restraints* reinforced by *low interests* spur military support for the regime, while *low restraints* reinforced by *high interests* lead to militaries backing protesters (p. 49). In the event of *high restraints* balanced by *high interests,* the military supports the status quo. When *low restraints* are balanced by low interests 'the military is hesitant to intervene too quickly in the process, lest doing so can irreparably harm its interests' (p. 51).

Following on from this theoretical framework set out in chapters two and three, Taylor moves on to case-studies analysing military responses and reactions to regime change in Tunisia, Syria and Egypt. In chapter four he argues that the Tunisian Armed Forces were strictly controlled by the regime (*low political restraints*). In order to change the status quo they did not benefit from (*high corporate interests*), the army supported the protesters during

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the 'Jasmine Revolution'. In the Syrian case (chapter five), the author argues that the Syrian Army supported the regime fervently because the army was compatible with the regime (*high restraints*). The toppling of al-Assad would have led to low gains and high losses for the army (*low interests*). The Egyptian case (chapter six) is more ambiguous. When the protests began, the Egyptian Army hesitated before deciding which side to support. Its initial indecision stemmed from uncertainty over whether its advantageous (*low restraints)* position would be maintained under the regime. Once Mubarak's regime became weakened by the protests, the army abandoned its neutrality and supported the protesters (*low interest*). In the second phase, when the army experienced a decline in its concessions and privileges under Muhammad Morsi's rule (*low interests*), the army ambitiously instigated a *coup d'état* and ousted Morsi (*high interest*), with a military commander replacing him as president. The Libyan case, as Taylor explains in chapter seven, demonstrates Gaddafi's full control over the army elite (*highs restraints*) which fully backed the regime (*low interests*). On the other hand, the Libyan regular army's resolve to change the status quo (*high interests*) pushed it to join the protests. Taylor also examines the effect of US foreign military sales and the US International Military Education and Training programme on the Arab uprisings in chapter eight. Contrary to popular opinion, he argues that there is no correlation between the military education of Arab officers in the US, foreign military aid and the decision-making of Arab militaries during the upheavals. He concludes that the armies reacted and responded to the protests based on domestic *restraints* and *interests* rather than external factors (p. 192). In the last (ninth) chapter, the author puts forward five different scenarios—best to worst—on the future of the countries discussed in the post-revolutionary era.

Taylor thus proposes a new framework for conceptualizing civil–military relations during the Arab uprisings. Due partly to his military background, the author is able to provide an in-depth analysis of military capabilities. However, his framework gives too much emphasis to the domestic dynamics of the upheavals and somehow ignores external factors. This is especially true in the Syrian case where the current situation cannot be explained by and goes well beyond civil–military relations. A list of acronyms would also have been helpful for the reader. All in all, the book is easy to read and can be recommended to researchers, scholars and students interested in civil–military relations the Middle East.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa in the world: capitalism, empire, nation-state. By Frederick Cooper. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. 2014. 144pp. £24.00. ISBN 978 0 67428 139 4.

In this slim book by the celebrated historian Frederick Cooper we get a sense of a changing of the guard, a senior statesman passing on the baton. Much as his seminal *Africa since 1940: the past of the present* (Cambridge University Press, 2002) has become a staple of Africanist reading lists, this allied synthesis, weighing in at just over 100 pages, will soon occupy its own place on the shelves of those interested in historicizing the development of diverse African states and their global genesis. It is a learned intervention, informed by *longue durée* perspectives and conceptual dexterity. The book emerges from a series of 2012 lectures at the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute at Harvard University and fittingly, like Du Bois himself, Cooper aims to render Africans more central to world history and underlines the salience of past trajectory for imagining African futures. Cooper is concerned with taking African agency seriously

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