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Ensuring Peace: The EU and UN's Approaches on International Conflicts

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Book Reviews

Ensuring Peace: The EU and UN's Approaches on International Conflicts

The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success by Annemarie Peen Rodt. London and New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp.xvi + 154 + bibliography + index $145.00 (hbk), ISBN 978-0-415-71478-5.

International Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: A Comparison of the European Union and the United Nations by Etain Tannam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp.xvi + 177 + bibliography + index $95.00 (hbk), ISBN 978-0-230-27335-1.

The European Union and the United Nations both emerged in the post-war period, but with different aims: the EU's primary purpose was to further economic integration in Europe, while the UN sought to 'maintain international peace and security'. In order to fulfil this goal, the UN began intervening in international conflicts both as a mediator and through the use of force. These actions have given rise to a large literature that seeks to assess the success or failure of the UN's peace operations and mediation efforts. The EU, in the meantime, gradually shifted from being an organization concerned only with economic integration to one concerned with unification across the political, military *and* economic realms. While these integration processes remain incomplete and not without controversy, the EU has gradually become a key player in international politics and it has begun to become involved in international conflicts, in particular since the end of the Cold War.

Despite this increased similarity in their roles, the EU's approach to international intervention has differed from the UN's. While the EU has primarily used instruments of soft power to affect conflicts and shift them towards conclusion (with a few notable exceptions such as Operation *Artemis*, the EU-led, UN-authorized military operation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo), the UN has combined both hard power and soft power in its approach. In addition, the UN Security Council has played a broader strategic role than the EU, with the EU mostly taking over or complementing operations from the UN. Nevertheless, like the UN, the EU has experienced both success and failure in its interventions in international conflicts.

Most contemporary studies evaluating peace operations by the UN and the EU draw attention to structural problems and difficulties in decision-making processes where interests of relevant stakeholders clash. The two books reviewed here present an exciting contribution to existing analyses of the effectiveness and structural dynamics of both institutions with regards to international

intervention. Annemarie Peen Rodt's book, *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success*, examines the EU's military conflict management both theoretically and through five cases taking place between 2003 and 2013. Rodt emphasizes the EU's transformation from an economic to a political or military actor – in particular efforts to establish the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – as key to understanding its success or failure.

Rodt distinguishes between two types of conflict management – military and civilian – and two types of conflict management actors – internal and external. Her book focuses on external military conflict management and examines five cases: Operation *Concordia* (Macedonia); Operation *Artemis* (Democratic Republic of Congo); Operation *Althea* (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Operation EUFOR (Democratic Republic of Congo); and Operation EUFOR (Chad/Central African Republic). She establishes a theoretical framework for evaluating the success of military conflict management operations (chapter 2), outlining four dimensions for evaluation: internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness (internal success), and external goal attainment and external appropriateness (external success). Criteria for internal success include whether the operations accomplished their stated goals on schedule and whether they were operationally and fiscally effective. Criteria for external success include the extent to which an operation helped to manage the conflict and the appropriateness of its use of force. In addition, Rodt asserts that certain internal and external conditions must be present for success. Specifically, to be successful a military conflict management operation must have both internal EU institutional and member support and external support from local actors in the host country, as well as regional and international support.

The book goes on to evaluate the five empirical cases within this frame. With regards to internal goal attainment, Rodt demonstrates that all the operations accomplished their operational objectives and could therefore all be considered successful. At the same time, due to delays in the decision-making processes of the EU and misconduct by some troops in *Concordia* and *Artemis*, the operations are only partly successful in terms of internal appropriateness. Rodt also declares all five operations as successful in terms of external success, arguing that they had a positive effect on the level of conflict in the areas where they were deployed and successfully managed violence during their periods of operation. In terms of internal conditions for success, Rodt demonstrates how the EU enjoyed a high level of support for its operations in Macedonia and Bosnia, but that in other cases, its internal support gradually decreased because of differences between member states. She draws attention to the EU as a whole, and emphasizes that 'to achieve success it does not matter which Member States contribute what, as long as the sum of EU support is sufficient for the operation to succeed' (119). With regards to the external conditions for success, Rodt shows that some operations were relatively successful in gaining external support, while others – namely, EUFOR DRC and EUFOR Chad/CAR) – were only partly successful. Rodt's empirical analyses validate her hypothesis that the more support an operation enjoys both internally and externally, the more successful it will be.

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Etain Tannam's book, *International Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: A Comparison of the European Union and the United Nations*, provides a useful point of comparison to Rodt's analysis. Tannam focuses on the bureaucratic decision-making processes of the European Commission and the UN Secretariat, taking a more institutionalist approach. Tannam claims that, contrary to general belief, the UN and the EU's policies are not solely shaped by member states' preferences and political will, but rather that both the UN Secretariat and the European Commission 'have autonomy under certain conditions' (1). To illustrate this, she examines three conflicts at various stages of resolution: Northern Ireland, 1988–98 (assumed resolved); Cyprus, 2002–04 (frozen); and Kosovo/Serbia, 2006–08 (frozen).

In the first section of the book, Tannam argues that in contradiction to neo-realist theories that assume that international organizations' polices drive from member states' preferences, 'international bureaucracies can have autonomy and that organizations' policy are not simply the sum of the parts of key members states but of the preferences and decisions made by bureaucrats' (15). She demonstrates that although UN decision making occurs primarily in the Security Council, the Secretariat has gradually increased its influence over the latter, particularly with regards to expertise and institutional memory. Similarly, the European Commission has increased its influence over the European Council. While the Commission was not originally intended to address foreign policy matters, changes both in institutional and international politics, such as the end of the cold war, gradually gave the Commission, in particular the Enlargement Directorate-General, a larger role in EU foreign policy making, including the use of the enlargement process as a conflict resolution tool.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 turn to the case studies to illustrate these points, and they also examine whether a difference can be observed 'between EU processes when the UN is not involved and EU policy processes when both the EU and UN are involved' (17). Tannam notes that while the Northern Ireland case (1988–98) might appear to support neo-realist assumptions regarding major power preferences, it actually illustrates the gradually shifting role of the European Commission. The peace process between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom was launched by the UK government, but the EU became involved in the process through economic support to Northern Ireland. The Commission's strategy towards Northern Ireland was based upon 'mutual economic dependency' with 'peace packages', rather than assuming responsibility for the entire process. The chapter of the Northern Ireland thus makes clear that while the Northern Ireland case was shaped mainly by British and Irish preferences, it was the first successful conflict management process for both the EU and the UK in which the UN was not involved. Although the Commission's role gradually lessened, the EU's role in conflict management generally was enhanced.

The chapter on the Cyprus case illustrates the interaction between UN and EU efforts. The UN had been involved in negotiating between the conflict parties since the 1960s, without success. Following Kofi Annan's appointment as Secretary-General in 1997, the UN's approach changed. Annan focused specifically on conflict resolution and appointed a special envoy from within the UN

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Secretariat. While subsequent mediation attempts also failed, the mediating team retained its autonomy and, with the drafting of the 2014 Annan Plan, demonstrated its influence on the Security Council and other member states.

By contrast, the EU's approach to Cyprus was determined mainly by Greek preferences and the Commission was less able to operate autonomously. In addition, the EU Council's decision to admit Greek Cyprus as a full member without considering the Annan Plan negatively affected the UN's efforts. The lack of agreement within the EU on Turkish EU membership also constrained the Commission.

In the case of Kosovo and Serbia, the EU seems to have learned lessons from the Cyprus case, and the EU and the Commission used the enlargement process as a conflict resolution tool towards Kosovo and Serbia. By contrast, the UN was restricted thanks to the lack of consensus on the status of Kosovo, in particular China and Russia's opposition to independence, and the dominant role played by the USA in the conflict and Kosovo's independence process. The case studies in the book thus demonstrate that though the UN had more autonomy than the EU in general, both organizations had 'limited bureaucratic autonomy' in policy making. In other words, the political decisions and consequences of the EU and the UN are not only based on member states' preferences but also bureaucrats' decisions and preferences.

Taken together, the books under review bring the parallel roles of the EU and the UN in international intervention into focus. Both volumes examine the process and effect of external intervention on managing conflicts and the ability of the two organizations to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability. The empirical findings of both books illustrate the difficulty and complexity in achieving success in military operations both from the institutional and operational perspective. Furthermore, Rodt's book makes a significant contribution to existing literature on evaluating the success of military conflict management operations by developing a specific set of success criteria. The most important message of Tannam's book relates to the bureaucratic autonomy of both organizations. Her findings highlight the impact of the bureaucratic decision-making process in both organizations and point to the role of bureaucrats – and not only member states and their preferences – in shaping and determining political outcomes.

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The European Union in the International Peace and Security Realm: An Overview of Policies and Practices

The EU and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis by Katarina Engberg. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp.188 + appendices + bibliography + index £85.00 (hbk), ISBN 978-0-415-82136-0.