in these centers. By studying coalition patterns in states like Kerala and Karnataka, Bussell makes the claim is that contesting ministers have the power to veto decisions by virtue of belonging to a party that could withdraw support and topple the government. On the other hand, in single-party systems, ministers in power have greater autonomy to modify policies to suit their interests and thus implement reforms.

From our present juncture, Bussell's claim that centers pose a definitive threat to corruption may seem unfounded, as some recent studies have shown that corruption has increased rather than decreased as a result of these centers. But considering that her surveys were conducted at an early phase, her optimism may not be unrealistic. Yet one of the key criticisms that can be leveled against Bussell's thesis is that it does not adequately contextualize service delivery reforms within a larger bureaucratic culture of rent seeking. As noted in recent scholarship, the opportunities for "grand" corruption in departments such as Public Works and Revenue have increased as a result of a phenomenal increase in government revenues spurred by India's economic growth. In such a scenario, "petty" bribes generated through delivery of public services are not central to a politicians' source of funding. Rather, bribes generated in the delivery of public services are put to use by frontline bureaucrats, such as village accountants who perform various duties as ordered from above. This includes hosting politicians who visit villages as part of their election campaigning. Thus, resistance to reforms in service delivery could arise from the bureaucratic apparatus charged with the delivery of these services rather than the political class that stands to gain or loose only marginally from these practices.

Politicians' resistance to reform is more keenly observed when attempts have been made to check arbitrary transfers of bureaucrats or to introduce mechanisms to monitor public works (such as construction of roads) sanctioned by politicians. Thus, while the Second Administrative Reform Commission 2009, noting that transfers of bureaucrats often coincide with a change in political regime, recommends reforms in stabilizing the tenure of officers across departments, no progress has been made in the implementation of these recommendations.

Despite these caveats, the book successfully highlights the role and functions of institutions in the implementation of reforms. Drawing from the work of Douglas North, Bussell makes the claim that institutions matter for policy implementation to be successful. This assertion is highly pertinent as India is in the process of implementing several welfare policies whose success will depend on the robustness of the concerned institutions. *Corruption and Reform in India* paves the way for further research on the characteristics of such institutions.

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Participatory Governance in the EU: Enhancing or Endangering Democracy and Efficiency? Karl-Oskar Lindgren and Thomas Persson. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011. 176 pp. $90 (cloth).

The book focuses on the European Union's (EU) Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) in order to evaluate whether civil society participation enhances or endangers the formation of a democratic EU. With the concern at the EU level (white papers, conferences) for enhancing the democratic state of the Union through the inclusion of civil society actors and the engendering of a new governance process, which could be highly useful in many policy sectors, the authors seek to contribute to this concern by conducting a new survey using a single but important

case study that could provide fresh empirics. The initial chapter justifies the choice of focusing on chemicals as "it involved one of the most ambitious attempts so far to apply the new approach to decision-making" with the Commission taking the lead (27). The second chapter explains and justifies the parameters of the survey. Two criteria were used: officials from the EU institutions who worked on REACH and those who served as participants in REACH conferences. From then on, chapters 3–5 cover the results of survey—structure for political contestation, access to information, and opportunities to influence the decision making—to show whether there has been greater and meaningful inclusion. In addition, to demonstrate that the changes in REACH have been far reaching, chapter 6 links the inclusion and the outcomes of the policies, while chapter 7 synthesizes the whole book.

My comments focus on, first, the argument and, second, the method. First, on the book's overall argument, there seems to be a problem with the main argument and some of the outcomes proposed by the authors. The definition of participation focuses on the "commitment of representative groups" to the formation and implementation of EU policies. As such, chapters 3–5 focus on the parameters for participatory democracy and inclusiveness: information symmetry, openness of the process, consultations, evaluations, and opportunities to influence the policy outcome. Clearly, these processes revolve around "input legitimacy," which does not deal with the outcomes and effectiveness of the *actual* policies. This is why in the last two chapters, the authors tried to link the inclusiveness of more actors and the effectiveness of policies in dealing with particular problems. It is on this level that the authors did not make a clear distinction between the governing process and governing outcomes as positive effects of participatory governance. While it seems that the actors felt that the governing process is better due to their inclusion in the decision-making process, there is a weak link to governing outcomes. On the one hand, there was little mention of institution building or spillover effects, briefly alluded to in the strong influence of the Commission. In this case, participatory governance may have contributed to institution building and greater legitimacy. On the other hand, when it comes to the actual policies, the positive perception of the REACH and civil society actors cannot account for the effectiveness of the policies (output legitimacy).

Second, the limitations the authors had to deal with contributed to the extent of their empirical contribution. One important criticism is the use of a single case study, the EU's REACH, in generalizing the effectiveness or the detriment of civil society inclusion. Although the authors were conscious of the choices that they were making, a single case does not appear convincing, most especially with only 37% participation of the REACH members. As such, until further studies are conducted, this limited sample inhibits further generalizations. Furthermore, this also matters at another level on how sectorial nuances influence the governing context. For instance, in telecommunications and electricity, also known as vertically integrated network industries, it is difficult to impose some level of competition due to the need for distribution infrastructure to be geographically and physically linked to production (Bartle 2006). As such, competition had to be enforced through the process of unbundling, disconnecting, and privatizing the distribution infrastructure from production. It is in this context that those who are in the business of the distribution have crucial roles and power in network industries in ensuring competition. It is also in this context that the debate over the Third Energy Package revolves around the decisions of, and in accordance with, the distributor. Thus, civil society participation is expected to be weak in this case. In chemicals, there might be some distinctive technological nuance, which could have influenced the results of the study. In addition, some authors have highlighted the importance of international chemical associations

in the governance of the sector (Levi-Faur 2006a). Furthermore, the national composition of civil society actors could also influence the survey results (Levi-Faur 2006b). Put simply, sectorial distinctiveness could account for the involvement of civil society participation, which appears to be crucial in judging whether their inclusion engenders more effective governance.

In sum, despite its limitations, this is a fresh and timely contribution to the governance literature. Primary research supplied is robust and opens up many questions in participatory governance. This is it a must read for policymakers and academics working on public policy.

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The Routledge Companion to Public-Private Partnerships. Piet de Vries and Etienne B. Yehoue, eds. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. 496 pp. $225.00 (cloth).

Public–private partnerships are an arrangement with proper risk sharing between public and private partners for providing public products. During the past decades, the world has witnessed the proliferation of public–private partnerships. This raises several critical questions: How to describe the history and trends of public–private partnerships? What are the emerging challenges facing public–private partnerships around the world? Is there any proper solution to deal with these challenges? How to provide sustainable public product at low cost in the context of public–private partnerships? What are the implications for policy practice? The answers to these questions are critically needed.

The Routledge Companion to Public-Private Partnerships has arrived just in time. Featuring the contributions of brilliant scholars from around the world, this collected volume analyzes the dynamics of public–private partnerships and multifaceted aspects affecting their sustainability, as well as exploring proper solutions to deal with challenges facing public–private partnerships.

This volume has 19 chapters, organized into eight thematic parts. Part I (chapter 1) describes the rise of public–private partnerships in the historical context of commercial society. Part II (chapters 2–4) examines public–private partnerships from institutional and legal perspectives. Part III (chapters 5–9) interprets risk allocation decision making of public–private partnerships using "transaction cost economics," adopts "incomplete contract" theory to evaluate public–private partnerships, identifies "organizational alignment" and "institutional alignment" as main factors explaining public–private partnerships, introduces game theory to study the interactions among all partners, and addresses corruptions at the decision-making stage, tender stage, and post-tender stage.

Part IV (chapter 10) focuses on the agencies and sources of "finance project" in public–private partnerships, regarded as the most popular financing approach in the